Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
Dense cooperative networks are an essential element of social capital for prosperous societies. These networks enable individuals to overcome collective action dilemmas by enhancing trust. In many biological and social settings, network structures evolve endogenously as agents exit relationships and build new ones. However, the interplay between game strategy and interaction structure by which evo... |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1093/comnet/cnz021 | Journal of Complex Networks |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
economic experiment,dynamic network,evolution,core-periphery structure,quit-for-tat,roving | Journal | 8 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 2051-1310 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.36 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
T. K. Ahn | 1 | 1 | 0.36 |
Jung-Kyoo Choi | 2 | 1 | 0.36 |
Yunkyu Sohn | 3 | 17 | 2.27 |