Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Virtually from its origins, with Turing and McCulloch's formulations, the use of the computational paradigm as a conceptual and theoretical framework to explain neurophysiology and cognition has aroused controversy. Some of the objections raised, relating to its constitutive and formal limitations, still prevail. We believe that others stem from the assumption that its objectives are different from those of a methodological approximation to the problem of knowing. In this work we start from the hypothesis that it is useful to look at the neuronal circuits assuming that they are the neurophysiological support of a calculus, whose full description requires considering three nested levels of organization, one of circuits, other of neurophysiological symbols and another of knowledge, and two description domains, the intrinsic to each level and that of the external observer. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1007/11499220_1 | IWINAC (1) |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
methodological approximation,full description,cognitive science,formal limitation,neurophysiological symbol,neurophysiological support,description domain,computational paradigm,neuronal circuit,external observer,nested level | Knowledge level,Neurophysiology,Cognitive science,Computer science,Turing,Artificial intelligence,Cognition,Observer (quantum physics),Instrumental and intrinsic value,Machine learning | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
3561 | 0302-9743 | 3-540-26298-9 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.60 | 4 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||