Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
GQ and Schnorr Identification Schemes: Proofs of Security against Impersonation under Active and Concurrent Attacks |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The Guillou-Quisquater (GQ) and Schnorr identification schemes are amongst the most efficient and best-known Fiat-Shamir follow-ons, but the question of whether they can be proven secure against impersonation under active attack has remained open. This paper provides such a proof for GQ based on the assumed security of RSA under one more inversion, an extension of the usual one-wayness assumption that was introduced in [5]. It also provides such a proof for the Schnorr scheme based on a corresponding discrete-log related assumption. These are the first security proofs for these schemes under assumptions related to the underlying one-way functions. Both results extend to establish security against impersonation under concurrent attack. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2002 | CRYPTO | best-known fiat-shamir follow-on,security proof,usual one-wayness assumption,corresponding discrete-log related assumption,schnorr identification scheme,underlying one-way function,active attack,schnorr identification schemes,concurrent attacks,concurrent attack,schnorr scheme,assumed security,one way function |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Conference | 2442 | 0302-9743 |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
3-540-44050-X | 126 | 5.15 |
References | Authors | |
25 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mihir Bellare | 1 | 16437 | 1481.16 |
| Adriana Palacio | 2 | 506 | 21.53 |