Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. Existing proposals on the problem are no longer able to provide proper incentives when rational users collude or launch sybil attacks. To overcome this key limitation, we propose a novel decentralized DCast multicast protocol and prove that it offers a novel concept of safety-net guarantee: A user running the protocol will always obtain at least a reasonably good utility despite the deviation of any number of rational users that potentially collude or launch sybil attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1145/1993806.1993872 | PODC |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
incentive mechanism,rational user,overlay multicast system,good utility,rational users collude,rational collusion,key limitation,sybil attack,proper incentive,dcast multicast protocol,novel concept,multicast | Incentive,Computer science,Computer security,Computer network,Sybil attack,Overlay multicast,Multicast,Collusion | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.37 | 5 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Haifeng Yu | 1 | 1009 | 92.71 |
| Phillip B. Gibbons | 2 | 6863 | 624.14 |
| Chenwei Shi | 3 | 60 | 3.59 |