Title
Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games.
Abstract
In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select equilibria for games in standard form. We introduce several possible denitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze the properties of these alternative denitions. We show that exactly one of the proposed extensions is consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi{Selten for games in standard form and captures stationarity.
Year
DOI
Venue
2003
10.1142/S0219198903001082
Mathematical Social Sciences
Keywords
DocType
Volume
publication,game theory,equilibrium selection
Journal
5
Issue
Citations 
PageRank 
4
2
0.47
References 
Authors
1
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
P. Jean-Jacques Herings118931.27
Ronald J. A. P. Peeters2212.24