Title
Modeling Bounded Rationality in Capacity Allocation Games with the Quantal Response Equilibrium
Abstract
We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically, and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects motivated by financial incentives. We find that the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that players are perfectly rational, substantially exaggerates retailers' tendency to strategically order more than they need. We propose a model of bounded rationality based on the quantal response equilibrium, in which players are not perfect optimizers and they face uncertainty in their opponents' actions. We structurally estimate model parameters using the maximum-likelihood method. Our results confirm that retailers exhibit bounded rationality, become more rational through repeated game play, but may not converge to perfect rationality as assumed by the Nash equilibrium. Finally, we consider several alternative behavioral theories and show that they do not explain our experimental data as well as our bounded rationality model. This paper was accepted by loana Popescu, guest editor, operations management.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1287/mnsc.1120.1531
Management Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
capacity allocation games,bounded rationality,repeated game play,single supplier,quantal response equilibrium,nash equilibrium,perfect optimizers,capacity allocation game,perfect rationality,bounded rationality model,model parameter,supply chain
Perfect rationality,Economics,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Rationality,Quantal response equilibrium,Microeconomics,Repeated game,Resource allocation,Supply chain,Nash equilibrium,Bounded rationality
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
58
10
0025-1909
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
12
0.68
12
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yefen Chen1120.68
Xuanming Su2604.31
Xiaobo Zhao311716.07