Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2003.09.010 | Mathematical Social Sciences |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C71 | Journal | 50 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0165-4896 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.51 | 2 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Walter Bossert | 1 | 59 | 14.56 |
| Jean Derks | 2 | 72 | 22.89 |
| Hans Peters | 3 | 120 | 30.92 |