Paper Info
Title
Game Solution, Epistemic Dynamics and Fixed-Point Logics
Abstract
Current methods for solving games embody a form of "procedural rationality" that invites logical analysis in its own right. This paper is a brief case study of Backward Induction for extensive games, replacing earlier static logical definitions by stepwise dynamic ones. We consider a number of analysis from recent years that look different conceptually, and find that they are all mathematically equivalent. This shows how an abstract logical perspective can bring out basic invariant structure in games. We then generalize this to an exploration of fixed-point logics on finite trees that best fit game-theoretic equilibria. We end with some open questions that suggest a broader program for merging current computational logics with notions and results from game theory. This paper is largely a program for opening up an area: an extended version of the technical results will be found in the forthcoming dissertation [26].
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.3233/FI-2010-261
Fundam. Inform.
Keywords
Field
DocType
fixed-point logics,broader program,epistemic dynamics,abstract logical perspective,brief case study,static logical definition,best fit game-theoretic equilibrium,backward induction,current computational logic,basic invariant structure,logical analysis,current method,game solution,computational logic,game theory,fixed point
Discrete mathematics,Rationality,Computer science,Invariant (mathematics),Game theory,Fixed point,Sequential game,Merge (version control),Backward induction,Logical analysis
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
100
1-4
0169-2968
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
14
0.82
13
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Johan van Benthem11181107.83
Amélie Gheerbrant21318.53