Title
Equilibria for broadcast range assignment games in ad-hoc networks
Abstract
Ad-hoc networks are an emerging networking technology, in which the nodes form a network with no fixed infrastructure: each node forwards messages to the others by using the wireless links induced by their power levels. Generally, energy-efficient protocols heavily rely on cooperation. In this paper, we analyze from a game-theoretic point of view the problem of performing a broadcast operation from a given station s. We show both theoretical and experimental results on how the existence of (good) Nash equilibria is determined by factors such as the transmission power of the stations or the payment policy that stations can use to enforce their reciprocal cooperation.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1007/11561354_3
ADHOC-NOW
Keywords
Field
DocType
nash equilibrium,energy-efficient protocol,broadcast range assignment game,fixed infrastructure,transmission power,reciprocal cooperation,power level,broadcast operation,game-theoretic point,ad-hoc network,nash equilibria,ad hoc network,energy efficient
Wireless network,Broadcasting,Reciprocal,Wireless,Computer science,Computer network,Game theory,Wireless ad hoc network,Nash equilibrium,Distributed computing,Broadcast range
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
3738
0302-9743
3-540-29132-6
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.39
12
Authors
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
pilu crescenzi19511.52
Miriam di Ianni214417.27
Alessandro Lazzoni320.39
Paolo Penna420216.42
Gianluca Rossi523521.60
Paola Vocca622524.79