Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The explosive growth of cellular traffic and its highly dynamic nature often make it prohibitive or even infeasible for a cellular service provider to provision enough cellular resources to support the peak traffic demands. The current best practice is to have the cellular service provider deploy alternative wireless technologies, such as Wi-Fi and Femtocells, on its own to complement the cellular network. However, this is not a viable long-term solution due to its high cost and the problem of wireless interference. We believe a more viable long-term solution is for the service provider to leverage resources from third-party resource owners on demand by buying capacity whenever needed. Measurement studies show that many third-party Wi-Fi hotspots and Femtocells have significant spare capacity even during busy hours. Moreover, when one cellular network is under stress, other cellular service providers in the same area may have spare cellular resources to provide dynamic roaming service. On-demand purchase of such third-party spare resources can potentially lead to a win-win solution: the cellular service provider achieves significant savings by not having to provision for the peak traffic demands; the third-party resource owners gain additional revenue from the otherwise wasted spare capacity; the overall user experience is also improved. In order for this approach to be successful, however, it is essential to have an incentive framework that can effectively foster collaboration while guarding against non-truthful and collusive behaviors. We use reverse auction to approach this problem. This is motivated by the following observations. First, a key challenge in utilizing resources from third-party resource owners is that we do not know their true valuation. Their cost function may be based on multiple considerations, some of which may not be revealed to the cellular service provider. Reverse auctions provide a formal framework for third-party resource owners to express the price they demand and for the cellular service provider to optimize the allocation based on the received bids. Second, by using reverse auctions, the cellular service provider no longer needs to negotiate a long-term bi-lateral agreement with each individual third-party resource owner, which is difficult due to dynamic traffic demands and resource availability. Third, reverse auctions can be incrementally deployed today, yielding savings to the cellular service provider even when only a subset of third-party resource owners participate. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | 10.1145/2348676.2348678 | MobiArch@MobiCom |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cellular traffic,cellular network,dynamic roaming service,peak traffic demand,incentivized cellular offloading,cellular resource,cellular service provider deploy,third-party resource owner,cellular service provider,reverse auction,spare cellular resource,cost function,user experience,best practice,service provider | Spare part,Computer security,Computer science,Business service provider,Cellular traffic,Service provider,Common value auction,Service level requirement,Roaming,Service delivery framework | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.35 | 0 |
Authors | ||
8 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wei Dong | 1 | 139 | 7.70 |
| Swati Rallapalli | 2 | 202 | 13.89 |
| Taewon Cho | 3 | 5 | 1.89 |
| Rittwik Jana | 4 | 786 | 80.35 |
| Lili Qiu | 5 | 3987 | 284.13 |
| K. K. Ramakrishnan | 6 | 4793 | 1087.48 |
| Leonid Razoumov | 7 | 1 | 0.69 |
| Yin Zhang | 8 | 3492 | 281.04 |