Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We prove that every multiplayer perfect-information game with bounded and lower-semicontinuous payoffs admits a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies. This result complements Example 3 in Solan and Vieille [Solan, E., N. Vieille. 2003. Deterministic multi-player Dynkin games. J. Math. Econom.39 911--929], which shows that a subgame-perfect ε-equilibrium in pure strategies need not exist when the payoffs are not lower-semicontinuous. In addition, if the range of payoffs is finite, we characterize in the form of a Folk Theorem the set of all plays and payoffs that are induced by subgame-perfect 0-equilibria in pure strategies. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1287/moor.1100.0469 | Math. Oper. Res. |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
N. Vieille,Perfect-Information Games,J. Math,Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs,Folk Theorem,Deterministic multi-player Dynkin game,pure strategy,multiplayer perfect-information game,lower-semicontinuous payoff | Journal | 35 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
4 | 0364-765X | 12 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.94 | 5 | 6 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| János Flesch | 1 | 108 | 26.87 |
| Jeroen Kuipers | 2 | 130 | 14.48 |
| Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi | 3 | 21 | 2.80 |
| Gijs Schoenmakers | 4 | 41 | 7.21 |
| Eilon Solan | 5 | 241 | 40.21 |
| Koos Vrieze | 6 | 56 | 7.43 |