Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We introduce a distributed and tractable mechanism for the allocation of continuously divisible resources to agents, that locally maximises the (Nash) product of their individual welfare. The mechanism involves specific m-resources-at-a-time multilateral deals over bits of resources, termed infinitesimal Nash transfers. It provides an effective way of building "strong social alliances", where in a social alliance agents fully cooperate for the global interest of society, and a strong social alliance has near-optimal utilitarian and egalitarian social welfare, as understood in social choice and welfare economics. The mechanism is scalable, can be distributed amongst agents and can be used to support, e.g., fair trade. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1145/1329125.1329257 | AAMAS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
resource allocation,infinitesimal nash transfer,egalitarian social welfare,divisible resource,tractable mechanism,individual welfare,social choice,strong social alliance,social alliance agent,fair trade,welfare economics,social welfare,integer programming,combinatorial auctions,petri nets | Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Fair trade,Alliance,Combinatorial auction,Computer science,Microeconomics,Resource allocation,Welfare,Infinitesimal,Distributed computing,Social Welfare | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 5 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paul-Amaury Matt | 1 | 101 | 5.00 |
| Francesca Toni | 2 | 1844 | 123.95 |