Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Philosophers and scientists interested in Artificial Intelli- gence emphasize the role of intention in rational commu- nication and interaction. The papers on rational agency by Cohen and Levesque are among the first to develop a logical theory of intention that accords with a large body of philo- sophical work, and provide the standard reference on BDI logics. However, Singh shows the theory to have certain log- ical inconsistencies and permit certain absurd scenarios. We present a modification of the theory that preserves the de- sirable aspects of the original while addressing the criticism of Singh. This modification is achieved by the refinement of certain assumptions, the introduction of an additional op- erator describing the achievement of expectations, and new, clarified definitions of intention. The amended theory fulfills a multitude of philosophical desiderata for intention, allow- ing for the representation of prior intention and intention- in-action and appropriately constraining agents' action and deliberation. Most importantly, the criticisms of Singh are shown to motivate an additional desiderata for intention: that action should not be intended for its own sake, but rather to bring about a desired proposition or situation. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2007 | FLAIRS Conference | Formal system,Criticism,Intentionality,Computer science,Modal logic,Virtue,Natural language processing,Artificial intelligence,Cognition,Epistemology,Doxastic logic |
DocType | Citations | PageRank |
Conference | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
41 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| James Creel | 1 | 3 | 1.79 |
| Christopher Menzel | 2 | 117 | 16.27 |
| Thomas R. Ioerger | 3 | 623 | 59.10 |