Title
How to Fake Auxiliary Input.
Abstract
Consider a joint distribution (X, A) on a set X x{0, 1}(l). We show that for any family F of distinguishers f : X x{0, 1}(l) -> {0, 1}, there exists a simulator h: X -> {0, 1}(l) such that no function in F can distinguish (X, A) from (X, h( X)) with advantage epsilon, h is only O(2(3l) epsilon(-2)) times less efficient than the functions in F. For the most interesting settings of the parameters (in particular, the cryptographic case where X has superlogarithmic min-entropy, epsilon > 0 is negligible and F consists of circuits of polynomial size), we can make the simulator h deterministic. As an illustrative application of our theorem, we give a new security proof for the leakage-resilient stream-cipher from Eurocrypt'09. Our proof is simpler and quantitatively much better than the original proof using the dense model theorem, giving meaningful security guarantees if instantiated with a standard blockcipher like AES. Subsequent to this work, Chung, Lui and Pass gave an interactive variant of our main theorem, and used it to investigate weak notions of Zero-Knowledge. Vadhan and Zheng give a more constructive version of our theorem using their new uniform min-max theorem.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1007/978-3-642-54242-8_24
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
DocType
Volume
ISSN
Conference
8349
0302-9743
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
9
0.53
25
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dimitar Jetchev11607.64
Krzysztof Pietrzak2151372.60