Paper Info
Title
CSR: Constrained Selfish Routing in Ad-Hoc Networks
Abstract
Routing protocols for ad-hoc networks assume that the nodes forming the network are either under a single authority, or else that they would be altruistically forwarding data for other nodes with no expectation of a return. These assumptions are unrealistic since in ad-hoc networks, nodes are likely to be autonomous and rational (selfish), and thus unwilling to help unless they have an incentive to do so. Providing such incentives is an important aspect that should be considered when designing ad-hoc routing protocols. In this paper, we propose a dynamic, decentralized routing protocol for ad-hoc networks that provides incentives in the form of payments to intermediate nodes used to forward data for others. In our Constrained Selfish Routing (CSR) protocol, game-theoretic approaches are used to calculate payments (incentives) that ensure both the truthfulness of participating nodes and the fairness of the CSR protocol. We show through simulations that CSR is an energy efficient protocol and that it provides lower communication overhead in the best and average cases compared to existing approaches.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1007/978-3-642-03417-6_18
WASA
Keywords
Field
DocType
routing protocol,ad-hoc routing protocol,altruistically forwarding data,decentralized routing protocol,average case,ad-hoc network,game-theoretic approach,constrained selfish routing,energy efficient protocol,csr protocol,ad-hoc networks,technical report,ad hoc network
Link-state routing protocol,Dynamic Source Routing,Path vector protocol,Computer science,Computer network,Interior gateway protocol,Wireless Routing Protocol,Optimized Link State Routing Protocol,Zone Routing Protocol,Distributed computing,Routing protocol
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
5682
0302-9743
1
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.36
15
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Christine Bassem152.84
Azer Bestavros23791764.82