Paper Info
Title
Monotonic and implementable solutions in generalized matching problems
Abstract
We consider one-to-one matching problems when preferences are weak orders and search for (Maskin-)monotonic and implementable solutions. We show that for any coalition structure T, the strong T-core is monotonic if and only if it is the individually rational solution. We introduce a solution, which we call the “union strong T-core”, and show that this solution is the minimal way to expand the strong T-core recovering monotonicity. We also show that the union strong T-core is implementable.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00107-8
Journal of Economic Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
C78,D78
Journal
114
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
2
0022-0531
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.67
0
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Lars Ehlers17810.01