Paper Info
Title
Detecting relay attacks with timing-based protocols
Abstract
Distance-bounding protocols have been proposed as a means of detecting relay attacks, also known as mafia fraud. In this paper we present the first symmetric key based distance-bounding protocol that is also resistant to so-called terrorist fraud, a variant of mafia fraud. Distance-bounding protocols require a communication channel that can exchange single bits with extremely low latency. This unconventional communication requirement has prompted Hancke and Kuhn to assert in a recent publication that ultra wide band (UWB) radio is necessary to achieve a useful distance-bounding resolution for RF security devices (contactless smart cards, RFID tags and the like). We analyse this assertion and present an alternative, novel communication approach that leverages the phenomena of side channel leakage to deliver a low latency channel. Our proposal is capable of detecting sophisticated relay attacks without resorting to the considerable expense and complexity of UWB radio. We present experimental results to support our arguments.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1145/1229285.1229314
ASIACCS
Keywords
Field
DocType
so-called terrorist fraud,low latency,mafia fraud,unconventional communication requirement,side channel leakage,low latency channel,uwb radio,communication channel,timing-based protocol,novel communication approach,distance-bounding protocol,ultra wide band,communication channels,linux,intrusion detection,access control,rfid tag,smart card,rootkit,contactless smart card
Symmetric-key algorithm,Contactless smart card,Internet privacy,Relay attack,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network,Communication channel,Distance-bounding protocol,Side channel attack,Latency (engineering),Relay
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
1-59593-574-6
104
5.87
References 
Authors
12
4
Search Limit
100104
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jason Reid117816.98
Juan Manuel González Nieto258640.44
Tee Tang31045.87
Bouchra Senadji418620.93