Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper analyzes ex post equilibria in the VCG combinatorial auctions. If Σ is a family of bundles of goods, the organizer may restrict the bundles on which the participants submit bids, and the bundles allocated to them, to be in Σ. The Σ-VCG combinatorial auctions obtained in this way are known to be truth-telling mechanisms. In contrast, this paper deals with non-restricted VCG auctions, in which the buyers choose strategies that involve bidding only on bundles in Σ, and these strategies form an equilibrium. We fully characterize those Σ that induce an equilibrium in every VCG auction, and we refer to the associated equilibrium as a bundling equilibrium. The main motivation for studying all these equilibria, and not just the domination equilibrium, is that they afford a reduction of the communication complexity. We analyze the tradeoff between communication complexity and economic efficiency of bundling equilibrium. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2004 | 10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00184-2 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C72,D44,D78 | Journal | 47 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0899-8256 | 47 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
6.94 | 20 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ron Holzman | 1 | 287 | 43.78 |
| Noa E. Kfir-Dahav | 2 | 59 | 10.02 |
| Dov Monderer | 3 | 307 | 60.57 |
| Moshe Tennenholtz | 4 | 3650 | 437.92 |