Paper Info
Title
Belief Revision and Rational Inference
Abstract
The (extended) AGM postulates for belief revision seem to deal with the revision of a given theory K by an arbitrary formula ', but not to constrain the revisions of two different theories by the same formula. A new postulate is proposed and compared with other sim- ilar postulates that have been proposed in the literature. The AGM revisions that satisfy this new postulate stand in one-to-one corre- spondence with the rational, consistency-preserving relations. This correspondence is described explicitly. Two viewpoints on iterative revisions are distinguished and discussed.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2002
Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research
satisfiability,artificial intelligent,belief revision
Field
DocType
Volume
Discrete mathematics,Mathematical economics,Computer science,Inference,Viewpoints,Artificial intelligence,Belief revision,Machine learning
Journal
cs.AI/0204
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
22
1.43
14
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Michael Freund19710.46
Daniel J. Lehmann21270330.79