Title
Generic cryptanalysis of combined countermeasures with randomized BSD representations
Abstract
In ICICS'04, Sim et al. proposed an attack against the full version of Ha-Moon's countermeasure which is one of enhanced countermeasures. The analysis technique is based on the fact that the probability for the appearance of an intermediate value is p=1/2. By our simulations, however, it is proven to be not true. Thus sometimes the output of their attack might be wrong because there exists the case that the probability p is so small that they can make a wrong decision. In this paper we repair the above attack, and then propose a generic analytical technique applicable to all BSD type countermeasures combined with some simple power analysis countermeasures. In order to show that the proposed attack is as practical as the usual differential power analysis (DPA), we estimate the number of samples and computational cost. Furthermore, we enhance the proposed attack in two ways such that it works against right-to-left algorithm in a simpler and more efficient way, and also works against one combined with an extra DPA countermeasure.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1007/11733447_9
CARDIS
Keywords
Field
DocType
proposed attack,extra dpa countermeasure,bsd type countermeasures,generic cryptanalysis,generic analytical technique,randomized bsd representation,simple power analysis countermeasures,wrong decision,combined countermeasures,analysis technique,enhanced countermeasures,probability p,usual differential power analysis,side channel attack,differential power analysis,power analysis,side channel attacks
Countermeasure,Power analysis,Existential quantification,Computer science,Computer security,Cryptography,Smart card,Cryptanalysis,Algorithm,Electronic countermeasure,Side channel attack
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
3928
0302-9743
3-540-33311-8
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.41
18
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Tae Hyun Kim135929.05
Dong-guk Han212424.94
Katsuyuki Okeya344738.47
JongIn Lim481975.16