Paper Info
Title
Strategic equilibria and decisive set structures for social choice mechanisms
Abstract
The connections between strategy selecting functions for social choice mechanisms and the power structure of the associated collections of decisive sets are investigated. Equilibrium conditions are presented that give rise to filters (oligarchies), prefilters (collegial polities), and acyclic majorities. The results broaden the dictatorship theorems of Gibbard and Satterthwaite and resolve open questions about conditions that lead to more democratic power structures.
Year
DOI
Venue
1982
10.1016/0165-4896(82)90030-0
Mathematical Social Sciences
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Decisive set,strategy proofness,acyclic majority,prefilter
Journal
2
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
4
0165-4896
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Edward W. Packel152.05
DONALD G. SAARI29929.14