Title
Fault Analysis Of The Ntruencrypt Cryptosystem
Abstract
In this paper, we present a fault analysis of the original NTRU public key cryptosystem. The fault model in which we analyze the cipher is the one in which the attacker is assumed to be able to fault a small number of coefficients of the polynomial input to (or output from) the second step of the decryption process but cannot control the exact location of injected faults. For this specific original instantiation of the NTRU encryption system with parameters (N, p, q), our attack succeeds with probability approximate to 1 - 1/p and when the number of faulted coefficients is upper bounded by t, it requires O((pN)(1)) polynomial inversions in Z/ pZ[x]/(x(N) - 1).
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1587/transfun.E94.A.1156
IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES
Keywords
Field
DocType
NTRU, side channel attacks, fault analysis, public key cryptography
Discrete mathematics,Cipher,NTRU,NTRUEncrypt,Polynomial,Theoretical computer science,Cryptosystem,Side channel attack,Fault model,Mathematics,Bounded function
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
E94A
4
0916-8508
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.53
8
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Abdel Alim Kamal1585.52
Amr Youssef223829.69