Title
Knowledge sharing and cooperation in outsourcing projects - A game theoretic analysis
Abstract
The popular notion of outsourcing is that it helps organizations cut down costs of operation. In reality, however, firms often outsource to organizations that possess complex, complementary skills. We model the interaction between employees of the ''host'' firm and the outsourcing firm, who have to share their knowledge and skill sets in order to work effectively as a team, but might be naturally antagonistic towards each other. The analysis shows that when the degree of complementarity of knowledge between the employees is high enough, better payoffs can be achieved if the top management enforces cooperation between the employees. In these situations, the involvement of the top management extends far beyond negotiating the contract to make the outsourcing successful.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1016/j.dss.2006.10.006
Decision Support Systems
Keywords
Field
DocType
outsourcing project,cooperative and non-cooperative games,knowledge complementarity,outsourcing,complementary skill,better payoff,popular notion,high enough,knowledge sharing,knowledge management,nash equilibrium,outsourcing firm,top management,skill set,game theoretic analysis,game theory,complementarity problem,modeling,cooperation,team work,non cooperative game,contract,knowledge engineering
Knowledge sharing,Computer science,Knowledge transfer,Knowledge management,Outsourcing,Staff management,Knowledge engineering,Game theory,Non-cooperative game,Knowledge process outsourcing
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
43
2
Decision Support Systems
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
43
1.74
4
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Subhajyoti Bandyopadhyay152435.12
Praveen Pathak261438.38