Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication service. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations in the original design by adding perfect forward secrecy, congestion control, directory servers, integrity checking, configurable exit policies, and a practical design for location-hidden services via rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We briefly describe our experiences with an international network of more than 30 nodes. We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2004 | USENIX Security Symposium | international network,original design,circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication,practical design,addresses limitation,configurable exit policy,anonymous communication,second-generation onion router,integrity checking,congestion control,directory server,perfect forward secrecy,low latency |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Anonymous web browsing,Computer security,Computer science,Server,Computer network,Mix network,Forward secrecy,Network congestion,Anonymity,Router,Onion routing,Distributed computing | Conference | 1503 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
68.54 | 38 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Roger Dingledine | 1 | 2582 | 165.83 |
| Nick Mathewson | 2 | 2058 | 97.03 |
| Paul Syverson | 3 | 4713 | 457.55 |