Paper Info
Title
Continuous Call Double Auctions with Indivisibility Constraints
Abstract
Double sided auctions provide an efficient mechanism to implement bidding based many to many negotiations. In these auctions, sellers and buyers submit asks and bids respectively. These bids and asks are matched and cleared periodically. Efficient algorithms exist to match these asks and bids in case there are no assignment constraints. In some problems, there can be situations where the supply from different asks cannot be combined to satisfy a demand. Such constraints are also called as indivisible demand bid constraints. In this paper, we attempt to investigate the problem with indivisible demand constraints. An algorithm that generates optimum solution is also presented.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1109/EEE.2005.55
EEE
Keywords
Field
DocType
assignment constraint,efficient mechanism,indivisible demand constraint,indivisible demand bid constraint,optimum solution,indivisibility constraints,efficient algorithm,continuous call,double auction,satisfiability,electronic commerce,computational complexity
Mathematical economics,Computer science,Common value auction,Clearance,Many-to-many (data model),Bidding,Forward auction,Computational complexity theory,Negotiation
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
0-7695-2274-2
3
0.39
References 
Authors
4
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
A. R. Dani1293.80
Arun K. Pujari242048.20
V. P. Gulati325714.82