Abstract | ||
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Tor, a distributed Internet anonymizing system, relies on volunteers who run dedicated relays. Other than altruism, these volunteers have no incentive to run relays, causing a large disparity between the number of users and available relays. We introduce BRAIDS, a set of practical mechanisms that encourages users to run Tor relays, allowing them to earn credits redeemable for improved performance of both interactive and non-interactive Tor traffic. These performance incentives will allow Tor to support increasing resource demands with almost no loss in anonymity: BRAIDS is robust to well-known attacks. Using a simulation of 20,300 Tor nodes, we show that BRAIDS allows relays to achieve 75% lower latency than non-relays for interactive traffic, and 90% higher bandwidth utilization for non-interactive traffic. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2010 | 10.1145/1866307.1866344 | ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
internet anonymizing system,performance incentive,interactive traffic,bandwidth utilization,tor node,improved performance,available relay,non-interactive tor traffic,new tor relay,non-interactive traffic,tor relay | Braid,Incentive,Computer security,Computer science,Latency (engineering),Anonymity,Bandwidth utilization,The Internet | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
31 | 1.12 | 38 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Rob Jansen | 1 | 283 | 16.78 |
Nicholas Hopper | 2 | 1469 | 95.76 |
Yongdae Kim | 3 | 1944 | 125.44 |