Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial votingmethod among at least 3 alternatives can be strategicallymanipulated. We prove a quantitative version of theGibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: a random manipulation by a singlerandom voter will succeed with non-negligible probability for everyneutral voting method among 3 alternatives that is far from beinga dictatorship. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1109/FOCS.2008.87 | Econometrica |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
quantitative version,everyneutral voting method,beinga dictatorship,non-negligible probability,gibbard-satterthwaite theorem state,non-trivial votingmethod,thegibbard-satterthwaite theorem,singlerandom voter,random manipulation,boolean functions,fourier transforms,social choice,gain,random processes,elections | Social choice theory,Arrow's impossibility theorem,Mathematical economics,Anti-plurality voting,Voting,Computer science,Stochastic process,Cardinal voting systems,Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem,Bullet voting | Conference |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0272-5428 | 60 | 3.26 |
References | Authors | |
5 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ehud Friedgut | 1 | 440 | 38.93 |
| Gil Kalai | 2 | 469 | 68.53 |
| Noam Nisan | 3 | 8170 | 809.08 |