Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this article we study cooperative multi-choice games with limited cooperation possibilities, represented by an undirected forest on the player set. Players in the game can cooperate if they are connected in the forest. We introduce a new (single-valued) solution concept which is a generalization of the average tree solution defined and characterized by Herings et al. (Games Econ. Behav. 62:77–92, ) for TU-games played on a forest. Our solution is characterized by component efficiency, component fairness and independence on the greatest activity level. It belongs to the precore of a restricted multi-choice game whenever the underlying multi-choice game is superadditive and isotone. We also link our solution with the hierarchical outcomes (Demange in J. Polit. Econ. 112:754–778, ) of some particular TU-games played on trees. Finally, we propose two possible economic applications of our average tree solution. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2012 | https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-012-1150-1 | Annals of Operations Research |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Average tree solution,Communication graph,(Pre-)core,Hierarchical outcomes,Multi-choice games | Journal | 196 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0254-5330 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.38 | 16 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sylvain Béal | 1 | 70 | 12.23 |
| aymeric lardon | 2 | 1 | 0.38 |
| Eric Rémila | 3 | 329 | 45.22 |
| Philippe Solal | 4 | 79 | 14.55 |