Paper Info
Title
Generating Pareto-Optimal Offers in Bilateral Automated Negotiation with One-Side Uncertain Importance Weights.
Abstract
Pareto efficiency is a seminal condition in the bargaining problem which leads autonomous agents to a Nash-equilibrium. This paper investigates the problem of the generating Pareto-optimal offers in bilateral multi-issues negotiation where an agent has incomplete information and the other one has perfect information. To this end, at first, the bilateral negotiation is modeled by split the pie game and alternating-offer protocol. Then, the properties of the Pareto-optimal offers are investigated. Finally, based on properties of the Pareto-optimal offers, an algorithmic solution for generating near-optimal offers with incomplete information is presented. The agent with incomplete information generates near-optimal offers in O(n log n). The results indicate that, in the early rounds of the negotiation, the agent with incomplete information can generate near-optimal offers, but as time passes the agent can learn its opponents preferences and generate Pareto-optimal offers. The empirical analysis also indicates that the proposed algorithm outperform the smart random trade-offs (SRT) algorithm.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2012
COMPUTING AND INFORMATICS
Bilateral negotiation,pareto-optimal offer,uncertain information,algorithm
Field
DocType
Volume
Autonomous agent,Computer science,Pareto optimal,Theoretical computer science,Pareto efficiency,Perfect information,Time complexity,Complete information,Negotiation,Bargaining problem
Journal
31
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
6
1335-9150
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hamid Jazayeriy161.15
Masrah Azrifah Azmi Murad2629.85
Md Nasir Sulaiman318632.80
Nur Izura Udzir416428.44