Title
Towards the attacker's view of protocol narrations (or, how to compile security protocols)
Abstract
As protocol narrations are widely used to describe security protocols, efforts have been made to formalize or devise semantics for them. An important, but largely neglected, question is whether or not the formalism faithfully accounts for the attacker's view. Several attempts have been made in the literature to recover the attacker's view. They, however, are rather restricted in scope and quite complex. This greatly impedes the ability of protocol verification tools to detect intricate attacks. In this paper, we establish a faithful view of the attacker based on rigorous, yet intuitive, interpretations of exchanged messages. This gives us a new way to look at attacks and protocol implementations. Specifically, we identify two types of attacks that can be thawed through adjusting the protocol implementation; and show that such an ideal implementation does not always exist. Overall, the obtained attacker's view provides a path to more secure protocol designs and implementations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1145/2414456.2414481
ASIACCS
Keywords
Field
DocType
protocol implementation,protocol verification tool,intricate attack,secure protocol design,faithful view,ideal implementation,security protocol,protocol narration,virtualization,web security
Virtualization,Internet security,Internet privacy,Man-in-the-middle attack,Cryptographic protocol,Computer science,Computer security,Implementation,Compiler,Formalism (philosophy),Semantics
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
25
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zhiwei Li11315107.73
Weichao Wang250033.87