Title
Explicit Solutions of Optimization Models and Differential Games with Nonsmooth (Asymmetric) Reference-Price Effects
Abstract
Models in marketing with asymmetric reference effects lead to nonsmooth optimization problems and differential games which cannot be solved using standard methods. In this study, we introduce a new method for calculating explicitly optimal strategies, open-loop equilibria, and closed-loop equilibria of such nonsmooth problems. Application of this method to the case of asymmetric reference-price effects with loss-aversive consumers leads to the following conclusions: (1) When the planning horizon is infinite, after an introductory stage the optimal price stabilizes at a steady-state price, which is slightly below the optimal price in the absence of reference-price effects. (2) The optimal strategy is the same as in the symmetric case, but with the loss parameter determined by the initial reference-price. (3) Competition does not change the qualitative behavior of the optimal strategy. (4) Adopting an appropriate constant-price strategy results in a minute decline in profits.
Year
DOI
Venue
2003
10.1287/opre.51.5.721.16758
Operations Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
reference-price effects,reference-price effect,asymmetric reference effect,optimal strategy,optimization models,nonsmooth problem,explicit solutions,asymmetric reference-price effect,steady-state price,initial reference-price,new method,differential games,optimal price,appropriate constant-price strategy result,steady state,optimal control,price stability,profitability,marketing
Reference price,Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Optimal control,Time horizon,Optimization problem,Mathematics,Profit (economics)
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
51
5
0030-364X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
42
2.95
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Gadi Fibich121645.40
Arieh Gavious211718.66
Oded Lowengart3685.79