Title | ||
---|---|---|
Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks |
Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique “cost and compensation” scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node–Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1007/11534310_37 | ICCNMC |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
initial packet generating rate,good teamwork,associated cost,efficient node forwarding strategy,selfish behavior,non-cooperative game,nash equilibrium,forwarding preference,proposed scheme,individual node,nodes packet generating requirement,selfish node,non cooperative game,wireless ad hoc network,distributed algorithm,ad hoc network,wireless network | Mobile computing,Wireless network,Computer science,Network packet,Computer network,Distributed algorithm,Wireless ad hoc network,Nash equilibrium,Non-cooperative game,Distributed computing | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
3619 | 0302-9743 | 3-540-28102-9 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 9 |
Authors | ||
4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Mingmei Li | 1 | 18 | 3.25 |
Eiji Kamioka | 2 | 96 | 21.65 |
Yamada S | 3 | 235 | 38.98 |
Yang Cui | 4 | 78 | 8.57 |