Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The block ciphers MISTY1 and MISTY2 proposed by Matsui are based on the principle of provable security against differential and linear cryptanalysis. This paper presents attacks on reduced-round variants of both ciphers, without as well as with the key-dependent linear functions FL. The attacks employ collision-searching techniques and impossible differentials. KASUMI, a MISTY variant to be used in next generation cellular phones, can be attacked with the latter method faster than brute force when reduced to six sounds. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2001 | 10.1007/3-540-44987-6_20 | EUROCRYPT |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cellular phone,provable security,brute force,key-dependent linear function,reduced-round variant,impossible differential,misty variant,latter method,linear cryptanalysis,next generation,reduced-round misty | Higher-order differential cryptanalysis,Boomerang attack,Block cipher,MISTY1,Piling-up lemma,Computer science,Impossible differential cryptanalysis,Theoretical computer science,Linear cryptanalysis,Differential cryptanalysis | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
2045 | 0302-9743 | 3-540-42070-3 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
15 | 1.32 | 6 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ulrich Kühn | 1 | 94 | 13.58 |