Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider the problem of detecting covert channels within security-enforcing object-capability patterns. Traditional formalisms for reasoning about the security properties of object-capability patterns require one to be aware, a priori, of all possible mechanisms for covert information flow that might be present within a pattern, in order to detect covert channels within it. We show how the CSP process algebra, and its model-checker FDR, can be applied to overcome this limitation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_7 | Formal Aspects in Security and Trust |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
information flow,covert channel,process algebra | Data mining,Information flow (information theory),Model checking,Computer science,A priori and a posteriori,Covert channel,Covert,Theoretical computer science,Intrusion detection system,Rotation formalisms in three dimensions,Process calculus | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
5983 | 0302-9743 | 3-642-12458-5 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
6 | 0.64 | 12 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Toby C. Murray | 1 | 35 | 3.71 |
| Gavin Lowe | 2 | 2389 | 175.16 |