Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In a finite game with strategic complementarities, every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual improvement path. If, additionally, the strategies are scalar, then every strategy profile is connected to a Nash equilibrium with a finite individual best response improvement path. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1007/s001820400195 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
nash equilibrium,game with strategic complementarities,best response dy- namics,better response dynamics,best response dynamics | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Price of stability,Best response,Equilibrium selection,Symmetric equilibrium,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Solution concept,Nash equilibrium | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
33 | 2 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
8 | 0.94 | 2 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nikolai S. Kukushkin | 1 | 64 | 11.62 |
| Satoru Takahashi | 2 | 33 | 4.39 |
| Tetsuo Yamamori | 3 | 13 | 1.71 |