Title
Partially ordered cooperative games: extended core and Shapley value
Abstract
In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in coopera- tive game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley-Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9
Annals OR
Keywords
Field
DocType
Cooperative games,Core,Shapley value,Partial order
Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Characteristic function (probability theory),Shapley value,Cooperative game theory,Game theory,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Sequential game,Example of a game without a value,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
158
1
0254-5330
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
9
0.89
4
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Justo Puerto171773.21
Francisco R. Fernández217618.42
Yolanda Hinojosa3988.14