Abstract | ||
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In this paper we analyze cooperative games whose characteristic function takes values in a partially ordered linear space. Thus, the classical solution concepts in coopera- tive game theory have to be revisited and redefined: the core concept, Shapley-Bondareva theorem and the Shapley value are extended for this class of games. The classes of standard, vector-valued and stochastic cooperative games among others are particular cases of this general theory. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2008 | 10.1007/s10479-007-0242-9 | Annals OR |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Cooperative games,Core,Shapley value,Partial order | Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Characteristic function (probability theory),Shapley value,Cooperative game theory,Game theory,Bondareva–Shapley theorem,Sequential game,Example of a game without a value,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
158 | 1 | 0254-5330 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
9 | 0.89 | 4 |
Authors | ||
3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Justo Puerto | 1 | 717 | 73.21 |
Francisco R. Fernández | 2 | 176 | 18.42 |
Yolanda Hinojosa | 3 | 98 | 8.14 |