Paper Info
Title
Agent-based simulation of dynamic online auctions
Abstract
The need to understand dynamic behavior in auctions is increasing with the popularization of online auctions. Applications include designing auction mechanisms, bidding strategies, and server systems. We describe simulations of a typical online auction, where the duration is fixed, and the second-highest price is continuously posted and determines the winner's payment. We modeled agents of exactly two types, idealizations and simplifications of those observed in practice: early bidders, who can bid any time during the auction period, and snipers, who wait till the last moments to bid. This allows us to study the interactions of the two types of bidders during the course of auctions, and the effects of the two strategies on the probability of winning, the final price, and the formation of price consensus in iterated auctions. Results show that 1) early bidders can win with a lower price on average than snipers, but much less often; 2) the late bidding strategy of snipers is effective; and 3) in iterated auctions, adjustment feedback of motivational parameters can lead to effective price consensus with small fluctuations.
Year
DOI
Venue
2000
10.1145/510378.510637
Winter Simulation Conference
Keywords
Field
DocType
online auction,auction mechanism,price consensus,second-highest price,agent-based simulation,lower price,final price,early bidder,iterated auction,auction period,dynamic online auction,effective price consensus,testing,computational modeling,software agents,human factors,electronic commerce,fluctuations,feedback,computer science,internet
English auction,Unique bid auction,Computer science,Simulation,Microeconomics,Dutch auction,Common value auction,Auction theory,Forward auction,Payment,Bidding
Conference
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
0-7803-6582-8
22
3.81
References 
Authors
1
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hideyuki Mizuta19012.75
Kenneth Steiglitz21128660.13