Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Public-key certificates allow a multitude of entities to securely exchange and verify the authenticity of data. However, the ability to effectively revoke compromised or untrustworthy certificates is of great importance when coping with misbehavior. In this paper, we design a fully distributed local certificate revocation scheme for ephemeral networks - a class of extremely volatile wireless networks with short-duration and short-range communications - based on a game-theoretic approach. First, by providing incentives, we can guarantee the successful revocation of the malicious nodes even if they collude. Second, thanks to the records of past behavior, we dynamically adapt the parameters to nodes' reputations and establish the optimal Nash equilibrium (NE) on-the-fly, minimizing the social cost of the revocation. Third, based on the analytical results, we define OREN, a unique optimal NE selection protocol, and evaluate its performance through simulations. We show that our scheme is effective in quickly and efficiently removing malicious devices from the network. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1016/j.comnet.2010.11.010 | Computer Networks |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Game theory,Wireless security,Ephemeral networks,Social optimum,Revocations | Journal | 55 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
5 | Computer Networks | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.43 | 15 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Igor Bilogrevic | 1 | 195 | 13.82 |
| Mohammad Hossein Manshaei | 2 | 786 | 53.69 |
| Maxim Raya | 3 | 1280 | 85.13 |
| J. -P. Hubaux | 4 | 10006 | 772.23 |