Paper Info
Title
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications.
Abstract
e study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences. In fact, we show, using simulation, that the chances that a woman can benefit from cheating are slim. In the second part of the paper, we consider a two-sided matching market found in Singapore. We study the matching mechanism used by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the placement of primary six students in secondary schools, and discuss why the current method has limited success in accommodating the preferences of the students, and the spe- cific needs of the schools (in terms of the "mix" of admitted students). Using insights from the first part of the paper, we show that stable matching mechanisms are more appropriate in this matching market and explain why the strategic behavior of the students need not be a major concern. (Stable Marriage; Strategic Issues; Gale-Shapley Algorithm; Student Posting Exercise)
Year
DOI
Venue
2001
10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784
Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimization
Keywords
Field
DocType
strategic issues,gale-shapley stable marriage problem,stable matching,stable marriage problem,stable marriage
Christian ministry,Mathematical optimization,Stable marriage problem,Strategic behavior,Computer science,Microeconomics,Artificial intelligence,Game theory,Cheating
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
47
9
0025-1909
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
32
2.57
7
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Chung-Piaw Teo186469.27
Jay Sethuraman243942.32
Wee-peng Tan3322.57