Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Our research proposes a simple buyer/seller game that captures the incentives dictating the interaction between peers in resource trading peer-to-peer networks. We prove that for simple reputation-based buyer strategies, a seller驴s decision whether to cheat or not is dependent only on the length of its transaction history, not on the particular actions committed. Given a finite number of transactions, a peer can compute a utility optimal sequence of cooperations and defections. With the limited information provided by many reputation systems, a peer has incentive to defect on a large fraction of its transactions. If temporal information is used, equilibrium is reached when peers predominantly cooperate. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1109/P2P.2005.29 | Peer-to-Peer Computing |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
reputation system,finite number,temporal information,simple buyer,large fraction,quantifying agent strategies,incentives dictating,simple reputation-based buyer strategy,particular action,limited information,seller game,distributed systems,electronic trading,transaction processing,e commerce | Transaction processing,Incentive,Computer science,Computer network,Peer to peer computing,Electronic trading,Database transaction,E-commerce,Reputation | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
0-7695-2376-5 | 1 | 0.36 |
References | Authors | |
10 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sergio Marti | 1 | 474 | 28.48 |
| Héctor García-Molina | 2 | 24359 | 5652.13 |
| Garcia-Molina, H. | 3 | 264 | 158.67 |