Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Generalized Vickrey Auction And Suppression Of Active Adversary Using Incentive-Compatible Implementation |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper presents an attempt to make rational active adversary passive using mechanism design. We propose a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme where the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2005 | 10.1093/ietfec/E88-A.1.255 | IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
generalized Vickrey auction, combinatorial auction, mechanism design, game-theory | Mathematical optimization,Vickrey auction,Incentive compatibility,Computer security,Combinatorial auction,Theoretical computer science,Generalized second-price auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Auction algorithm,Revenue equivalence,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
E88A | 1 | 0916-8508 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Makoto Yokoo | 1 | 3632 | 421.99 |
| Koutarou Suzuki | 2 | 518 | 29.57 |