Title
Complexity Of Ordering Dynamics Under Pure Revenue-Sharing Contracts
Abstract
This paper examines the ordering dynamics in a supply chain coordinated by pure revenue-sharing contracts by relaxing the complete rationality assumption in the literature. Analytical results demonstrate that the retailer's ordering dynamics exhibits chaos with a positive (Lebesgue) measure in the long term no matter what percentage is adopted in a pure revenue-sharing contract as long as certain conditions are met. This unpredictability of ordering dynamics serves as a warning signal to a contract designer that s/he should pay attention to the profiles of external market and internal behavioral parameters that may lead to chaotic ordering dynamics, and then certain incentive terms may be installed in the contract to motivate the retailer to choose appropriate adjustment speed parameter values such that chaos is likely to be avoided and the supply chain can be coordinated.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1109/ICSMC.2006.384520
2006 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEMS, MAN, AND CYBERNETICS, VOLS 1-6, PROCEEDINGS
Keywords
Field
DocType
supply chain,supply chains,commerce
Rationality,Revenue sharing,Incentive,Control theory,Computer science,Microeconomics,Supply chain,Chaotic,Lebesgue integration
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
2
null
1062-922X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
3
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Debing Ni1433.65
Kevin W. Li259425.14
Xiaowo Tang310614.46