Title
Regret Minimization Under Partial Monitoring
Abstract
We consider repeated games in which the player, instead of observing the action chosen by the opponent in each game round, receives a feedback generated by the combined choice of the two players. We study Hannan-consistent players for these games, that is, randomized playing strategies whose per-round regret vanishes with probability one as the number n of game rounds goes to infinity. We prove a general lower bound of Ω(n-1/3) for the convergence rate of the regret, and exhibit a specific strategy that attains this rate for any game for which a Hannan-consistent player exists.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1287/moor.1060.0206
Mathematics of Operations Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
regret minimization,internal regret,hannan consistency,combined choice,hannan-consistent player,repeated games,randomized playing strategy,partial monitoring,game round,specific strategy,number n,convergence rate,imperfect monitoring,per-round regret,lower bound,pricing,feedback,repeated game,primary,yttrium,convergence
Convergence (routing),Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Regret minimization,Regret,Upper and lower bounds,Infinity,Repeated game,Rate of convergence,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
31
3
0364-765X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
23
2.48
20
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Nicolò Cesa-Bianchi14609590.83
GáBor Lugosi21092195.02
Gilles Stoltz335131.53