Title
An update on the side channel cryptanalysis of MACs based on cryptographic hash functions
Abstract
Okeya has established that HMAC/NMAC implementations based on only Matyas-Meyer-Oseas (MMO) PGV scheme and his two refined PGV schemes are secure against side channel DPA attacks when the block cipher in these constructions is secure against these attacks. The significant result of Okeya's analysis is that the implementations of HMAC/NMAC with the Davies-Meyer (DM) compression function based hash functions such as SHA-1 are vulnerable to DPA attacks. In this paper, first we show a partial key recovery attack on NMAC/HMAC based on Okeya's two refined PGV schemes by taking practical constraints into consideration. Next, we propose new hybrid NMAC/HMAC schemes for security against side channel attacks assuming that their underlying block cipher is ideal. We show a hybrid NMAC/HMAC proposal which can be instantiated with DM and a slight variant to it allowing NMAC/HMAC to use hash functions such as SHA-1. We then show that M-NMAC, MDx-MAC and a variant of the envelope MAC scheme based on DM with an ideal block cipher are secure against DPA attacks.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1007/978-3-540-77026-8_31
INDOCRYPT
Keywords
Field
DocType
hmac proposal,hash function,pgv scheme,cryptographic hash function,block cipher,hybrid nmac,side channel cryptanalysis,dpa attack,refined pgv scheme,ideal block cipher,hmac scheme,new hybrid nmac,side channel attacks
Hash-based message authentication code,Block cipher,Computer security,Computer science,Cryptographic hash function,Computer network,Side channel cryptanalysis,Hash function,Side channel attack,MDC-2,Key-recovery attack
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
4859
0302-9743
3-540-77025-9
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
8
0.62
13
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Praveen Gauravaram125622.22
Katsuyuki Okeya244738.47