Paper Info
Title
Routing games with elastic traffic
Abstract
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a novel class of multipath routing games with elastic traffic. Users open one or more connections along diffierent feasible paths from source to destination and act selfishly--seeking to transfer data as fast as possible.Users only control their routing choices , and once these choices have been made, the connection rates are elastic and determined via congestion control algorithms (e.g.TCP) which ultimately maximize a certain notion of the network utility. We analyze the existence and the performance of the Nash Equilibria (NEs) of the resulting routing games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1145/1639562.1639587
SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Keywords
Field
DocType
routing game,nash equilibria,diffierent feasible path,connection rate,routing choice,elastic traffic,congestion control algorithm,resulting routing game,certain notion,act selfishly,multipath routing game,multipath routing,congestion control
Mathematical optimization,Multipath routing,Equal-cost multi-path routing,Link-state routing protocol,Dynamic Source Routing,Policy-based routing,Hierarchical routing,Computer science,Static routing,Computer network,Routing domain
Journal
Volume
Issue
Citations 
37
2
4
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.78
3
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Peter Key1110884.97
Alexandre Proutiere255840.94