Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
With relatively few exceptions, the literature on efficient (practical) secure computation has focused on secure two-party computation (2PC). It is, in general, unclear whether the techniques used to construct practical 2PC protocols-in particular, the cut-and-choose approach-can be adapted to the multi-party setting. In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose for practical secure three-party computation. The three-party case has been studied in prior work in the semi-honest setting, and is motivated by the observation that real-world deployments of multi-party computation are likely to involve few parties. We propose a constant-round protocol for three-party computation tolerating any number of malicious parties, whose computational cost is only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art two-party protocols. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1007/978-3-662-44381-1_29 | ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - CRYPTO 2014, PT II |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Journal | 8617 | 0302-9743 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
13 | 0.53 | 43 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seung Geol Choi | 1 | 734 | 30.60 |
| Jonathan Katz | 2 | 7579 | 347.97 |
| Alex J. Malozemoff | 3 | 158 | 8.98 |
| Vassilis Zikas | 4 | 184 | 17.87 |