Abstract | ||
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The notion of "boundary ambient" has been recently introduced to model mul- tilevel security policies in the scenario of mobile systems, within pure Mobile Ambients calculus. Information flow is defined in terms of the possibility for a confidential ambient/data to move outside a security boundary, and boundary crossings can be captured through a suitable Control Flow Analysis. We show that this approach can be further enhanced to infer which ambients should be "protected" to guarantee the lack of information leakage for a given process. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
---|---|---|
2002 | IFIP TCS | mobile ambients,static analysis.,boundary inference,security,enforcing security policies,static analysis,security policy,control flow analysis,information flow |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Information flow (information theory),Information leakage,Computer science,Inference,Computer security,Multilevel security,Static analysis,Control flow analysis,Security policy,Distributed computing | Conference | 96 |
ISSN | ISBN | Citations |
1571-5736 | 1-4020-7181-7 | 8 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.53 | 12 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Chiara Braghin | 1 | 105 | 8.86 |
Agostino Cortesi | 2 | 791 | 66.19 |
Riccardo Focardi | 3 | 1229 | 99.99 |
Steffen van Bakel | 4 | 335 | 28.24 |