Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Escrowable identity-based authenticated key agreement protocols are welcome in certain closed groups applications, where audit trail is a legal requirement. In this paper, we present a strongly secure one-round escrowable identity-based two-party authenticated key agreement protocol, which captures all basic desirable security properties including perfect forward secrecy, ephemeral secrets reveal resistance and so on, and is provably secure in the extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) model. We show that the security of the protocol can be reduced to the standard computational bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Assuming that no adversary can obtain the master private key for the escrow mode, our scheme is secure as long as each party has at least one uncompromised secret. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first escrowable identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol provably secure in the eCK model. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1016/j.camwa.2012.01.041 | Computers & Mathematics with Applications |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Authenticated key agreement,Identity-based cryptography,Provable security,Bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption,Key escrow | Authentication,Computer security,Audit trail,Random oracle,Forward secrecy,Key-agreement protocol,Key escrow,Public-key cryptography,Mathematics,Provable security | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
65 | 9 | 0898-1221 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
11 | 0.59 | 26 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Liang Ni | 1 | 56 | 2.09 |
| Gong-Liang Chen | 2 | 160 | 13.54 |
| Jian-hua Li | 3 | 558 | 98.16 |