Paper Info
Title
Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Abstract
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman who are not married to each other both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals to matching students to schools. A well-known algorithm to solve this problem is the Gale-Shapley algorithm, which runs in polynomial time. It has been proven that stable marriage procedures can always be manipulated. Whilst the Gale-Shapley algorithm is computationally easy to manipulate, we prove that there exist stable marriage procedures which are NP-hard to manipulate. We also consider the relationship between voting theory and stable marriage procedures, showing that voting rules which are NP-hard to manipulate can be used to define stable marriage procedures which are themselves NP-hard to manipulate. Finally, we consider the issue that stable marriage procedures like Gale-Shapley favour one gender over the other, and we show how to use voting rules to make any stable marriage procedure gender neutral.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1145/1558013.1558105
Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research
Keywords
DocType
Volume
stable marriage procedure,gender neutrality,stable marriage problem,practical application,voting rule,gale-shapley algorithm,polynomial time,well-known problem,gale-shapley favour,stable marriage procedure gender,well-known algorithm
Conference
abs/0909.4437
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
15
0.79
16
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Maria Silvia Pini135330.28
Francesca Rossi22067176.42
K. Brent Venable316213.58
Toby Walsh44836416.00