Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The access control provided by a physical lock is based on the assumption that the information content of the corresponding key is private --- that duplication should require either possession of the key or a priori knowledge of how it was cut. However, the ever-increasing capabilities and prevalence of digital imaging technologies present a fundamental challenge to this privacy assumption. Using modest imaging equipment and standard computer vision algorithms, we demonstrate the effectiveness of physical key teleduplication --- extracting a key's complete and precise bitting code at a distance via optical decoding and then cutting precise duplicates. We describe our prototype system, Sneakey, and evaluate its effectiveness, in both laboratory and real-world settings, using the most popular residential key types in the U.S. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1145/1455770.1455830 | ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
privacy assumption,corresponding key,physical lock,modest imaging equipment,access control,physical key secrecy,optical decoding,physical key teleduplication,precise bitting code,precise duplicate,digital imaging technology,popular residential key type,information content,keys,digital image,a priori knowledge,computer vision | Internet privacy,Physical security,Computer science,Computer security,Lock (computer science),A priori and a posteriori,Secrecy,Computer vision algorithms,Digital imaging,Access control,Decoding methods | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
12 | 1.88 | 3 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Benjamin Laxton | 1 | 86 | 4.60 |
| Kai Wang | 2 | 1734 | 195.03 |
| stefan savage | 3 | 11017 | 1067.00 |